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INTRODUCTION
A recent Ninth Circuit decision, Valenzuela Gallardo v.
Lynch, has created a three-pronged circuit split over the proper
interpretation of statutory language in the Immigration and
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Nationality Act (INA). In Gallardo, the government initiated a
deportation action against a Mexican alien residing in the U.S.
due to his conviction as an accessory after the fact under Cali-
fornia law. 1
. The INA provides that any alien convicted of an "aggravated
felony" is "deportable."2 The Act does not statutorily define the
term aggravated felony, but instead provides a list of various
types of criminal activities that would qualify an alien for de-
portation. 3 One of the provisions in the statute states that a
crime "relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation
of perjury, or bribery of a witness, for which the term of impris-
onment is at least one year" makes an alien deportable.4 The
precise meaning of this language, particularly "relating to ob-
struction of justice," is arguably vague.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board), the
agency tasked with hearing appeals of decisions to begin de-
portation hearings under the INA, has found the phrase "relat-
ing to obstruction of justice" to be ambiguous and thus open
for interpretation under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.5 The Board has interpreted the
phrase to refer to an "affirmative and intentional attempt, moti-
vated by a specific intent, to interfere with the process of jus-
tice, irrespective of the existence of an ongoing criminal
investigation or proceeding."6
The Fifth Circuit has deferred to this interpretation as rea-
sonable under the Chevron doctrine.7 The Ninth Circuit in Gal-
lardo, however, refused to defer to the BIA's interpretation.
Instead, they applied the doctrine of "constitutional avoidance"
to hold that Congress had no intention of allowing the Board to
interpret the statute as stretching to the limits of the Constitu-
tion, and remanded the case back to the BIA.8
In contrast, the Third Circuit has read § 110 1(a)(43)(S) of
the INA as unambiguous and thus closed to agency interpreta-
tion.9 This is the optimal answer from a statutory interpreta-
1 Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 811 (9th Cir. 2016).
2 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).
3 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012).
4 Id. at § 1101(a)(43)(S).
5 See In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I.&N. Dec. 838, 839-40 (B.I.A. 2012);
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
6 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 838.
7 See United States v. Gamboa-Garcia, 620 F.3d 546, 549-50 (5th Cir.
2010).
8 See Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 823, 825 (9th Cir. 2016).
9 See Denis v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 633 F.3d 201, 209-10 (3d Cir.
2011).
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tion perspective. The distinct phrases "relating to" and
"obstruction of justice" can be easily defined by looking to Su-
preme Court precedent and other statutes. "Relating to" re-
quires a causal or logical connection between the crime
committed and the crime enumerated in the statute.10 "Ob-
struction of justice" is a heading in the U.S. Code, which con-
tains a list of federal crimes that are considered "obstruction of
justice" crimes." Thus, there is no reason to allow the BIA to
interpret the statute.
Further, a broader interpretation of § 1101(a)(43)(S), as
this Note's straightforward textual analysis suggests, gives the
government greater discretion to deport dangerous or other-
wise undesirable aliens: a key concern of the drafters of the
INA.1 2 At the same time, the fact that the statute does not
require deportation, but rather only makes an alien "deport-
able," acts as an important safety valve to prevent deportation
for comparatively minor offenses.
Section I of this Note details the purpose and provisions of
the INA. Section II provides a brief overview of the legal doc-
trine used to determine the appropriate level of judicial review
of federal agency decisions. Section III provides an in-depth
analysis of each of the varying approaches that circuit courts
have employed in analyzing the issue of the "relating to ob-
struction of justice" language in § 1101(a)(43)(S). Finally, Sec-
tion IV discusses which approach is best, from both a statutory
interpretation and a public policy standpoint.
I
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT HAS A LONG
HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF PROTECTING
AMERICANS FROM DANGEROUS ALIENS
The United States has a long and storied past of restricting
immigration. Historically, these concerns were rooted in dis-
trust of foreign cultures and a desire to retain a single Ameri-
can cultural identity.13 For example, the Immigration Act of
1924 reduced existing immigration quotas for many countries
to 2% of that nation's immigrant population in the United
1o Seeid.at210-11.
11 See id. at 209.
12 The legislative history and the INA itself supports my view that the drafters
of the INA were concerned with allowing greater government power to deport
dangerous immigrants. This will be discussed further in Part I.
13 See Milestones 1921-1936: The Immigration Act of 1924 (Johnson-Reed
Act), U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE HISTORImA, https://history.state.gov/mile
stones/ 1921-1936/immigration-act [http://perma.cc/A5WK-PJ4A.
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States as of 1890,14 and banned immigration from most Asian
countries. 15
The INA was passed in 1952.16 The INA retained the ex-
isting immigration quotas that the Immigration Act of 1924 put
in place, although it did remove the ban on Asian immigration
and naturalization.1 7 The primary concern of legislators in
continuing to place heavy restrictions on Eastern European
and Asian immigrants was this time anchored in national se-
curity.' 8 Many of these nations had communist governments,
giving rise to fears of a communist infiltration.' 9 To protect
America from communist subversion, legislators voted over-
whelmingly for a system of immigration that was "limited and
selective," circumventing President Truman's veto of the
legislation.20
The INA is still in effect today, although several pieces of
legislation over the years have significantly altered it. For ex-
ample, the law was changed in 1965 to eliminate the quota
system and instead prioritize family reunification and immigra-
tion of those with special job skills. 2 1 With that said, the INA
still has a strong bend towards the protection of the American
people from dangerous alien residents, which was particularly
renewed in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. For instance,
the law was amended to allow for the deportation of aliens who
are terrorists or those who provide support to terrorist
organizations. 2 2
More specifically, and most relevant to this Note, is an INA
provision which has consistently allowed for the deportation of
alien residents who have committed certain "aggravated
14 The previous law capped immigration at 3% of the foreign nation's popula-
tion in the United States as of 1910. Considering that the majority of Eastern and
Southern European immigrants had not yet arrived in 1890, this essentially elimi-
nated immigration from these nations which were culturally distinct from "na-
tives" of Western European descent. See id.
15 Id.
16 See Milestones 1945-1952: The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(McCarren-Walter Act), U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, https://
history. state.gov/milestones/ 1945-1952/immigration-act [http://perma.cc./
NDA4-7EWW].
17 Granted, this was basically in name only. Asian immigration was still
highly disfavored, with quotas for some Asian nations set as low as one hundred
persons. See id.
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 Id. President Truman perceived the INA as discriminatory and un-Ameri-
can. See id.
21 See Catherine Lee, Family Reunification and Limits of Immigration Reform*:
Impact and Legacy of the 1965 Immigration Act, 30 Soc. F. 528, 539 (2015).
22 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2012).
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felon[ies]." 23 The INA does not give a list of exactly which spe-
cific crimes in the state and federal codes are considered aggra-
vated felonies, but instead lays out a series of general
categories of criminal activity that would qualify an alien for
deportation. 24 Included in this list is just about any sort of
felony imaginable, including but not limited to murder,
"crime[s] of violence," theft, fraud, forgery, drug trafficking, and
operating a prostitution business. 25 This Note focuses specifi-
cally on one of the crimes in this parade of horribles: "an of-
fense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation
of perjury, or bribery of a witness, for which the term of impris-
onment is at least one year."26 While the language referring to
perjury and bribery of a witness is relatively straightforward,
the phrase "offense relating to obstruction of justice" has gen-
erated a great deal of controversy between the BIA and the
federal circuit courts that review BIA decisions, as to what this
language means and which crimes it encompasses.2 7
II
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS OF
STATUTORY LANGUAGE: A BASIC FRAMEWORK
At this point, it is worth a brief discussion of the level of
judicial review by the federal circuit courts over federal agen-
cies' interpretations of the statutes they are tasked with enforc-
ing. That discussion revolves around a landmark Supreme
Court decision, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. In Chevron, pursuant to a statutory direc-
tive in the Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) promulgated regulations requiring states that had failed
to meet national air quality standards to issue permits that
would regulate "stationary source" pollution.2 8 The EPA inter-
preted "stationary source" to allow states to issue permits on a
plant-wide basis, taking pollution output from each source
within a facility into account as a whole rather than regulating
each individual smoke stack. 29
23 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iil) (2012).
24 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012).
25 See id.
26 1I at § 1101(a)(43)(S).
27 See, e.g., In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I.&N. Dec. 838, 839-40 (B.I.A.
2012) (finding that "offense relating to obstruction of justice" is ambiguous and,
therefore, leaving it up to federal courts to interpret).
28 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840-41
(1984).
29 See id. at 840.
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In Chevron, the National Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) challenged the EPA's interpretation of the statute as
allowing the above-mentioned regulatory scheme.30 The D.C.
Circuit held that the agency's regulation was inconsistent with
the statutory delegation of Congress, and set aside the regula-
tion. 3 1 On review, the Supreme Court established a two-part
test for determining when the judiciary should defer to an
agency's interpretation of a statute it has been tasked with
enforcing:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Con-
gress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court deter-
mines Congress has not directly addressed the precise ques-
tion at issue . .. the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.... If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency
to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the
agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regu-
lation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.3 2
In Chevron, the Court determined that the statute and congres-
sional intent were unclear as to whether the agency's interpre-
tation of "stationary source" was the intended application of
the statute.3 3 Therefore, the Court held that the EPA's inter-
pretation was reasonable and thus permissible under the
statute.3 4
Chevron seems to generally give agencies a wide berth in
interpreting the meaning of the statutes they are tasked with
enforcing. However, Chevron has been qualified to some ex-
tent. For example, the Supreme Court in United States v. Mead
Corp. held that Chevron deference only applies in cases where
Congress intended for the agency to promulgate regulations
carrying the force of law, and where the agency does in fact
produce regulations carrying the force of law.3 5 The Mead
court suggested that Chevron deference should apply where the
agency is interpreting statutory language while engaging in
30 See ic.
31 See id. at 842.
32 Id. at 842-44.
33 See id. at 851.
34 See id. at 866.
35 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
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rulemaking3 6 or adjudication,3 7 not to agency decisions that
are reached through informal processes or that do not have
binding legal effect (such as a guidance document or policy
manual).38 This practice of determining whether the agency
action carries the force of law, and thus whether Chevron defer-
ence ought to apply, is commonly referred to as "Chevron step
zero."39
Yet another possible stumbling block to Chevron deference
is a somewhat undeveloped exception that recently appeared in
King v. Burwell, also known as the landmark "Obamacare"
case.40 This case raised the possibility that Chevron deference
may be denied in some cases involving "deep economic and
political significance," even if the statutory language is vague
and the agency is acting with the force of law.4 1 For example,
the Court considered the question of whether Congress in-
tended tax credits to be available to those who purchased
health insurance through the federal exchange, as an issue of
"deep economic and political significance," and therefore did
not give deference to the IRS's interpretation. 4 2 Instead, in
these cases, the judiciary is to take the responsibility of inter-
preting the statute.4 3
36 As a side note, rulemaking is the process by which agencies propose regu-
lations pursuant to statutory delegations of power, take public comment on those
proposals, and then promulgate final regulations. See generally A Guide to the
Rulemaking Process, OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, https://www.federalregister.
gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking-process.pdf. [https://perma.cc/9L9N-
BZVS] (describing the rulemaking process).
37 Adjudication is the process by which agencies make individual determina-
tions on matters such as permitting, benefits decisions, etc. See Charles H. Koch
Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 ALA. L. REv. 693, 693 (2005).
Adjudication can also create precedents which are used as broad agency policy.
See id. at 695. Whether an agency chooses to use rulemaking or adjudication to
create future regulations is generally a question left to the agency's preference.
See id. at 696.
38 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 229. With that said, there has been some muddying
of the waters on this issue. Courts have afforded Chevron deference in some
instances where formal procedures are not involved, but where the agency has
clearly dedicated a great deal of thought to the matter and brings a significant
amount of expertise to bear on the issue. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero
25-26 (U. OF CHI. PuB. LAw & LEGAL THEORY, Working Paper No. 91, 2005), https://
chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https: / /www.
google.com/&httpsredir= 1 &article= 1053&context=publiclawandlegalftheory
[https://perma.cc/6QK5-8NYN].
39 See Sunstein, supra note 38, at 3.
40 King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
41 Id.
42 1&.
43 See id.
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Now that the basic framework for how judges are to review
agency interpretations of statutory language is on the table, we
turn to the specific question of how the phrase "relating to
obstruction of justice" has been interpreted by the BIA and the
various federal circuits that review its decisions. Unsurpris-
ingly, the circuits disagree with one another over the proper
interpretation of the statute and/or the level of deference that
should be afforded to the BIA's interpretation. The next section
of this Note will analyze the various positions in this compli-
cated circuit split.
III
A THREE-PRONGED CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. The Board of Immigration Appeal's Interpretation
The best place to start in surveying the circuit split is to lay
out exactly how the BIA has interpreted the statutory language
"relating to obstruction ofjustice." The BIA's current precedent
on this issue comes from its ruling in In re Espinoza-Gonzalez.
In that case, the BIA was tasked with determining whether the
crime of misprision of a felony 4 4 was a crime relating to ob-
struction of justice under § 1101.45 Although there is no spe-
cific crime in the U.S. Code entitled "obstruction of justice,"
there is a list of various offenses that are organized under the
heading "obstruction of justice,"4 6 which the court reviewed.4 7
Misprision of a felony is not one of the crimes listed under the
heading, and according to the BIA the crimes that are listed
involve as elements: "either active interference with proceed-
ings of a tribunal or investigation, or action or threat of action
against those who would cooperate in the process of justice."4 8
Thus, the BIA held that misprision of a felony should not be
considered a crime relating to obstruction of justice:
We do not believe that every offense that, by its nature, would
tend to "obstruct justice" is an offense that should properly
be classified as "obstruction of justice." The United States
Code delineates a circumscribed set of offenses that consti-
44 "Elements of the crime of misprision of a felony are that the principal
committed and completed the felony alleged and that the defendant had full
knowledge of that fact, failed to notify the authorities, and took an affirmative step
to conceal the crime." In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I.&N. Dec. 889, 890 (B.I.A.
1999). In this case, the underlying felony was "conspiracy to possess marijuana
with intent to distribute." Id. at 889.
45 See id. at 889-90.
46 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1518 (2015).
47 See 22 I.&N. at 890-91.
48 Id. at 893.
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tute "obstruction of justice," and although misprision of a
felony bears some resemblance to these offenses, it lacks the
critical element of an affirmative and intentional attempt,
motivated by a specific intent, to interfere with the process of
justice.4 9
The BIA would later clarify its interpretation after the Ninth
Circuit held in Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch that Espinoza-
Gonzalez stood for the proposition that a criminal act consti-
tutes an obstruction of justice crime "when it interferes with an
ongoing proceeding or investigation."5 0 A three-judge panel of
the BIA said the Ninth Circuit's rendering of the existing BIA
interpretation as requiring the obstruction of an ongoing pro-
ceeding or investigation was incorrect,5 1 and clarified its inter-
pretation of the "relating to obstruction of justice" language as
follows:
[Tihe affirmative and intentional attempt, with specific intent,
to interfere with the process of justice- demarcates the cate-
gory of crimes constituting obstruction of justice. While
many crimes fitting this definition will involve interference
with an ongoing criminal investigation or trial, we now clarify
that the existence of such proceedings is not an essential
element of an "offense relating to obstruction of justice."5 2
B. The Ninth Circuit: Defer to the Agency, but Use the
Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine in this Case to
Invalidate the Interpretation as it Stands
The Ninth Circuit clashed with the BIA once again, recently
deciding in Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch that although the
statutory language of § 1101(a) (43) (S) is vague under Chevron
step one, the agency's clarified interpretation is impermissible
49 Id. at 893-94.
50 Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 812 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis
omitted).
51 In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I.&N. Dec. 838, 842 (B.I.A. 2012). A court's
interpretation of statutory language delegated to an agency is only binding on the
agency if the court is interpreting the language from the position that the statute
is unambiguous, and the agency has no authority to interpret it itself. Where the
court is interpreting a statute itself, or interpreting the agency's interpretation,
from the position that the language is ambiguous, the agency is not bound by the
court's interpretation in future cases and may alter its interpretation over time
with changes in political administrations, policy goals, etc. See Nat'l Cable &
Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 982-83 (2007). This
sort of situation can be thought of as similar to a federal court applying state law
in an Erie case.
52 25 I.&N. at 841.
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because of the constitutional avoidance canon of statutory
interpretation.5 3
Mr. Valenzuela Gallardo is a Mexican citizen with perma-
nent resident status in the United States.54 He was arrested in
2007 when he was found in a stolen vehicle with methamphet-
amine, ecstasy, and a loaded firearm.5 5 Ultimately, Mr.
Valenzuela Gallardo was convicted as an accessory to a felony
under California state law.5 6 An immigration judge ordered
that Mr. Valenzuela Gallardo be removed to Mexico in 2010 on
the grounds that the crime of accessory to a felony should be
considered an aggravated felony related to obstruction of jus-
tice under § 1101(a)(43)(S). 5 7 Mr. Valenzuela Gallardo ap-
pealed the decision to the BIA, where it was upheld, and he
subsequently appealed to the Ninth Circuit.5 8
The Ninth Circuit applied the Chevron test because the BIA
had interpreted the statutory language of the INA with the force
of law (an adjudicatory precedent). 59 While the Ninth Circuit
had deferred to the BIA in the past, the court refused to do so in
this instance. Although the language itself was ambiguous in
the court's view, the court used a canon of statutory interpreta-
tion called "constitutional avoidance" when interpreting the
statutory language.6 0 Constitutional avoidance is a rule of
statutory interpretation that says courts should avoid inter-
preting statutes, when possible, in such a way as to raise con-
stitutional questions. 6 1 Essentially, the court will not allow an
agency to interpret a statute in a constitutionally suspect man-
ner unless Congress has clearly expressed an intention that
the agency do So. 6 2
According to the Ninth Circuit, the BIA's interpretation
raises serious constitutional questions.6 3 Because the
agency's interpretation of obstruction of justice as applying to
crimes involving "interference with the process of justice" gives
no parameters of what exactly this means, potential violators
53 Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d. at 815-16.
54 Id. at 811
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 812.
59 See id. at 815.
60 Id. at 816.
61 See Christopher J. Walker, Avoiding Normative Canons in the Review of
Administrative Interpretations of Law: A Brand X Doctrine of Constitutional Avoid-
ance, 64 ADMIN L. REV. 139, 140 (2012).
62 See Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 816.
63 See id. at 818-19.
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are not put on notice regarding what conduct would violate the
statute.6 4 Although there is a clear mens rea requirement-a
specific intent to interfere with the process ofjustice-potential
criminals are left unaware of what the actus reus necessary to
commit the crime is. 6 5 As the court was unable to find congres-
sional intent that the agency interpret the statute in such a
constitutionally questionable manner, it refused to defer to the
agency's current interpretation. 66 Instead, the court remanded
the case back to the BIA and demanded that it re-interpret the
statute, preferably in such a way that would require that an
aggravated felony relating to obstruction of justice involve a
specific intent to interfere with a judicial proceeding or
investigation. 67
The dissent in Valenzuela Gallardo raises several compel-
ling points. The dissent argues that even if the use of the
constitutional avoidance canon is appropriate in a Chevron
case, it should not be applied here because the BIA's interpre-
tation of the statute does not raise any "'grave' constitu-
tional . .. concerns."68 Many obstruction crimes, such as those
under the federal accessory after the fact statute,69 do not re-
quire a nexus between the obstruction in question and a spe-
cific event or proceeding, but merely a general interference with
the ability of a police officer or prosecutor to investigate crimi-
nal activity. 70 Finally, even if it were conceded that the BIA's
interpretation pushed up against a constitutional boundary,
the dissent argues that there is in fact congressional intent to
allow such an interpretation based on the language "relating to
obstruction of justice."7 1 The "relating to" language implies
that Congress is giving the agency wide latitude to interpret the
statute to its constitutional limits. 72
C. The Fifth Circuit: Defer to the Agency's Interpretation
Prior to the Ninth Circuit's recent analysis, there was an
existing circuit split between the Fifth Circuit, which has
adopted the stance that courts should defer to the agency's
64 Id. at 821-22.
65 See id. at 821.
66 See id. at 823.
67 See id. at 824
68 Id. at 826
69 The BIA has previously held that a crime under the the federal accessory
after the fact statute qualifies as an aggravated felony relating to obstruction of
justice. See In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I.&N. Dec. 889, 891 (B.I.A. 1999).
70 See Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 826.
71 Id. at 832 (emphasis added).
72 See id.
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interpretation, and the Third Circuit, which held that the stat-
utory language was not ambiguous, and thus not open for
agency interpretation. The defendant in United States v. Gan-
boa-Garcia (the Fifth Circuit case in which they deferred to the
BIA) was an illegal immigrant who had been convicted of acces-
sory to murder in 2001, deported, and charged with illegal re-
entry in 2004.73 She was removed to Mexico in 2007 upon
completing her sentence, but was found once again in Texas in
2009 and again charged with illegal re-entry.74
A major issue in Gamboa-Garcia was the dispute over
whether accessory to murder should be considered an aggra-
vated felony for the purpose of enhancing the defendant's sen-
tence. 75 The federal sentencing guidelines incorporate 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43) and its categories of aggravated felonies for the
purpose of determining whether a sentence should be en-
hanced. 76 The court deferred77 to the BIA's interpretation of
"relating to obstruction of justice" as "either active interference
with proceedings of a tribunal or investigation, or action or
threat of action against those who would cooperate in the pro-
cess of justice."78
D. The Third Circuit: No Agency Deference
The Third Circuit has taken a completely different path
than the Fifth and Ninth Circuits in reviewing BIA decisions,
refusing to defer to the agency's interpretation of the "relating
to obstruction of justice" language in Denis v. Attorney General
of the United States.7 9 Mr. Denis, a Haitian citizen, obtained
permanent resident status in 1992.80 Denis was convicted of
manslaughter and tampering with physical evidence after he
killed, dismembered, and disposed of the corpse of a client
73 United States v. Gamboa-Garcia, 620 F.3d 546, 547 (5th Cir. 2010).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 548.
76 See id.
77 See id. at 549. Interestingly, the court does not really explain why. The
opinion does not offer a Chevron analysis.
78 IL at 550. This is the BIA's interpretation prior to its clarification that
interference with a judicial proceeding is not necessary to constitute obstruction
of justice. It could be argued that this interpretation is somewhat different from
what the Ninth Circuit was looking at in Valenzuela Gallardo, however, neither I
(nor the dissent in Valenzuela Gallardo) believe that the interpretation is substan-
tively different. There was no reason to view the BIA's original interpretation as
requiring interference with a proceeding. The BIA was merely clarifying its inter-
pretation in In re Espinoza-Gonzalez.
79 See Denis v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 633 F.3d 201, 209 (3d Cir.
2011).
80 Id. at 203.
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following an altercation in his place of business.81 After his
conviction, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
sought to' have Mr. Denis removed to Haiti and brought a suc-
cessful action before an immigration judge. 82
The Third Circuit was unequivocal in its belief that the
statutory language in question was not ambiguous, and there-
fore not open to agency interpretation: "The instant petition for
review does not present an obscure ambiguity or a matter com-
mitted to agency discretion. Rather, the phrase 'relating to
obstruction of justice' in Section 1101(a)(43)(S) includes two
discrete phrases-'relating to' and 'obstruction of justice'-
both of which are capable of definition."83
Similar to the BIA, the Third Circuit reviewed the listing of
obstruction of justice crimes under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1518,
which according to the court, clarifies which sorts of conduct
Congress wanted the language to encompass.8 4
Additionally, the court held that the phrase "relating to"
must be read to broaden the statute's reach.8 5 To do otherwise
would be to not afford the words any effect at all.8 6 The court
referred to a recent Supreme Court holding that "relating to"
should be defined as follows: "to stand in some relation; to have
bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association
with or connection with." 7 As such, rather than merely perus-
ing the listing of crimes under obstruction of justice in Title 18
and determining whether the crime the alien was charged with
contains elements of one of those offenses,8 8 the court will
instead look for a logical connection between the crimes listed
and the offense in question.89
In applying this to the facts of the present case, the court
found that 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 and 1512, which deal with efforts
to obstruct the administration of justice and the destruction of
evidence, respectively, covered Mr. Denis's conduct in dismem-
bering and disposing of his client's corpse.9 0 In the court's
view, this was a straightforward application of the test, so the
81 Id. at 204
82 Id. at 204-05.
83 Id. at 209.
84 See id. (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383
(1992)).
85 See iCL
86 See id.
87 ICt
88 This is the test that the BIA endorsed in its Espinoza precedent. See supra
subpart III.A.
89 Denis, 633 F.3d at 212.
90 See id. at 212-13.
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opinion provides another example of how it would apply this
logical connection test.9 1 The court pointed to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a) (43) (R), which declares that crimes relating to forgery
or counterfeiting constitute an aggravated felony for the pur-
pose of deportation.92 The court stated that a conviction for a
crime such as trafficking in counterfeit goods would be consid-
ered an aggravated felony "relat[ing] to" forgery even though the
person convicted of the crime may not have actually forged or
counterfeited the goods himself.9 3
Recently, the Third Circuit has unfortunately narrowed its
analysis of the logical relationship test. In Flores v. Attorney
General of the United States, the court determined that acces-
sory after the fact was not an aggravated felony related to ob-
struction of justice.9 4 According to the court, accessory after
the fact did not bear a logical connection to any of the crimes
listed under the obstruction of justice header.9 5 Essentially,
the court held that the crime committed must involve the same
core elements of one of the enumerated federal obstruction of
justice crimes.9 6 In the case at hand, the court determined
that all of the obstruction of justice crimes require some con-
nection to a judicial hearing or investigation. In contrast, ac-
cessory after the fact does not require that the perpetrator
know about or intend to interfere with any official proceeding.9 7
The Flores dissent, on the other hand, would continue to
advance the common-sense approach originally put forth in
Denis.9 8 The dissent argues that the crime of accessory after
the fact is clearly logically related to obstruction of justice.99
The act of assisting a felon and aiding him in escaping justice
certainly has the effect of frustrating the ability of the court
system to prosecute the principal offender. 100
To summarize, there are four interpretations on the table:
BIA/Fifth Circuit's interpretation requiring a specific intent to
interfere with the process of justice (regardless of the existence
of an ongoing judicial proceeding); the Ninth Circuit's proposed
interpretation that would require interference with a specific,
91 See id. at 210-12.
92 See id, at 210.
93 See id. at 2 11
94 See Flores v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 856 F.3d 280, 292 (3d Cir.
2017).
95 See id. at 288, 292-94.
96 See id.
97 See id. at 292-93.
98 See ic at 297.
9 See ic at 300.
100 See id.
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ongoing proceeding or investigation; the Third Circuit's broader
interpretation requiring only a logical connection to one of the
obstruction of justice crimes (but requiring interference with
an ongoing proceeding or investigation); and the Third Circuit
dissent's loose logical relationship test.
IV
WHAT IS THE BEST ANSWER TO THIS CIRCUIT SPLIT?
A. Why Do We Care? Or Why Should We Care?
As it stands, the law as to what constitutes an aggravated
felony under the "relating to obstruction of justice" section of
§ 1101 is not only unclear, but worse, it may be inconsistently
applied based on where one lives. It is true that in many in-
stances we would see the same result no matter which of the
interpretations we apply. For example, all of the circuits would
agree that a crime like destruction of evidence is an aggravated
felony. However, a crime such as accessory after the fact or
accessory to a felony, is a more open question. According to the
BIA's interpretation, accessory after the fact is an aggravated
felony.1 0 1 The same would be true under the Third Circuit's
dissent in Flores.10 2 But as we have seen, the Third Circuit and
the Ninth Circuit have said that accessory after the fact is not
an aggravated felony. 103
The bigger problem is that the Ninth and Third Circuits
have adopted a very narrow interpretation of the obstruction of
justice category that fails to advance Congress's clear goal of
adequately protecting the American people from enemies "for-
eign and domestic."' 0 4
The easiest solution to this problem would be to follow the
lead of the Second and Eighth Circuits and "punt" on the is-
sue.1 0 5 Unfortunately, that is not a viable solution in the long
run. So long as the Supreme Court has not addressed this
matter, however, this Note will attempt to provide a satisfactory
answer. This Note's analysis of what is the optimal solution
will consider the issue from both a statutory interpretation
perspective and a public policy standpoint.
101 Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 812 (9th Cir. 2016).
102 Flores, 856 F.3d at 297.
103 See id. at 211; Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 823-24.
104 See supra Part I.
105 See Armenta-Lagunas v. Holder, 724 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2013);
Higgins v. Holder, 677 F.3d 97, 104 (2d Cir. 2012). Both cases concluded that
there was no need to decide the issue at this time.
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B. Chevron Step Zero
This Note will examine this issue through the prism of a
hypothetical BIA ruling that an alien resident should be de-
ported because he committed an aggravated felony relating to
obstruction of justice. The defendant appeals the case to the
appropriate circuit court of appeals. The first thing that the
court of appeals needs to decide is whether to apply the Chev-
ron test.
The administration of § 1227(a)(iii), which allows resident
aliens to be deported for certain aggravated felonies, 10 6 is as-
signed to the Department of Homeland Security under the su-
pervision of the Department of Justice (the Attorney General
signs off on deportations). 0 7 In using the formal adjudication
process to determine whether a criminal resident alien has
committed an aggravated felony and is ripe for deportation,
there is no question that the agency is acting with the force of
law. Thus, it seems clear that this action meets Chevron "step
zero". This is not like the Mead case where the agency issued a
mere guidance document. 108 Nor is it likely that this would fall
under some version of the "deeply important economic and
political issue" exception like the question of whether tax cred-
its should be available to those purchasing healthcare on the
federal exchange in Burwell. 0 9 "Obamacare," the centerpiece
legislation of the Obama administration, has been a major po-
litical football for the last half decade and continues to have a
massive impact on the American economy. It is not compara-
ble to a relatively mundane question of whether a certain crime
makes a resident alien deportable. With that said, this excep-
tion comes from a very recent Supreme Court decision and is
not especially well-developed at this point. It is possible in the
future that we could see more issues get pushed out of Chevron
depending on what direction the Court takes this exception.
There is also an argument that courts should disregard
Chevron "step zero" in cases where the agency's expertise is not
implicated.1 0 Rather than automatically deferring to the
agency on its interpretation of ambiguous statutory language,
the courts should instead exercise discretion, allowing the
106 See supra Part I.
107 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2008); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(d)(4) (2008).
108 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 239 (2005).
109 See supra Part II.
110 See Paul Chaffin, Expertise and Immigration Administratior: When Does
Chevron Apply to BIA Interpretations of the INA?, 69 N.Y.U ANN. SURV. AM. L. 503,
564 (2013).
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agency to answer questions it is uniquely qualified to answer,
while the court interprets ambiguous statutory language that
is unrelated to the expertise of the agency. 111 For example, the
question of what "relating to obstruction of justice" means is
not a question that the BIA is uniquely qualified to answer.
Courts are arguably just as capable, if not more capable, of
analyzing this language. According to proponents of this the-
ory, allowing courts to interpret ambiguous language that is
not uniquely related to an area of agency expertise creates
uniformity in the application of immigration law because it
avoids the problem of various circuits applying Chevron differ-
ently and reaching disparate results.1 12
This argument is not persuasive, however, and would
make the current problem of circuit splits even worse. How will
the circuits agree on the question of whether a piece of statu-
tory language is within the expertise of the agency and when it
is not? Some courts will say language ought to be left to the
agency, and some will say that they should interpret it them-
selves. This is the same problem that already exists under
Chevron, as seen through inconsistent interpretations leading
to circuit splits. And even if the circuits manage to agree that
the language in question should be interpreted by the courts
and not the agency, they are likely to each interpret the lan-
guage differently.' 1 3 It makes more sense to follow Chevron. If
the statute is genuinely unambiguous, the circuits should all
apply the same interpretation (the unambiguous intent of Con-
gress). If the statue is ambiguous, the agency will interpret the
language and each circuit will defer to the agency. In a perfect
world, where the courts are applying Chevron correctly, we
should not see circuit splits. Although the argument that
courts are better qualified to make this legal analysis than an
agency bureaucrat is appealing, Chevron still protects against
clearly incorrect interpretations in step two.11 4 If the agency's
construction of the statutory language is unreasonable, the
court can reject it.' 1s
111 See id. at 507.
112 See id. at 509-10.
113 One need look no further than the circuit split that is the subject of this
Note to find an example of this proposition.
114 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) ("Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.").
115 See id.
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C. Chevron Step One
Based on this "step zero" analysis, our hypothetical judicial
review should proceed to Chevron step one. Again, Chevron
step one requires the court to ascertain whether the intention
of Congress is clear from the statute.' 1 6 If it is, the court must
apply the legislature's intended interpretation of the statute. 117
Making this determination is easier said than done, however.
In Chevron, the Supreme Court said that a judge performing a
step one analysis should employ "traditional tools of statutory
construction."' 18 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not
provided guidance as to what tools should be used, in what
order, etc. 119
One of these potential statutory interpretation tools is the
constitutional avoidance doctrine, which the Ninth Circuit ap-
plied in Valenzuela Galardo.12 0 Constitutional avoidance is a
rule of statutory interpretation that says courts should avoid
interpreting statutes, when possible, in such a way as to raise
constitutional concerns.121 The Ninth Circuit believed the
agency's interpretation was constitutionally suspect (although
it did not say it was patently unconstitutional) because "inter-
ference with the process of justice" may be too vague to inform
an individual of what sort of activity the statute covers.1 2 2 Ad-
ditionally, there is no evidence that Congress wanted the
agency to interpret the statute to its constitutional limit.
Whether courts should apply constitutional avoidance in
the Chevron context is a significant bone of contention between
courts, and one that the Supreme Court has not directly ad-
dressed.1 2 3 I agree with courts and scholars who argue that
constitutional avoidance should not be employed in a Chevron
analysis.1 2 4 Constitutional avoidance is about choosing be-
tween different viable interpretations. If there are such inter-
pretations to choose from, then the statutory language is
obviously ambiguous, and under Chevron, the court ultimately
needs to defer to the agency if its interpretation is reasonable.
116 See supra Part II.
117 See id.
118 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
119 See Melina Forte, May Legislative History Be Considered at Chevron Step
One: The Third Circuit Dances the Chevron Two-Step in United States v. Geiser, 54
VILL. L. REv. 727, 728 (2009).
120 See supra subpart III.B.
121 See id.
122 Jic
123 See Walker, supra note 61, at 173.
124 See id. ("[A] court cannot trump a reasonable interpretation by [sic] the
agency .. . by invoking constitutional avoidance at Chevron step one.").
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That is not what happened in Valenzuela Gallardo, however.
The Ninth Circuit majority never said that the agency's inter-
pretation was unconstitutional.1 2 5 It said that the interpreta-
tion raised constitutional questions that a different
interpretation (requiring a connection to a hearing or investiga-
tion) could have avoided. 126 As the Supreme Court said in
Chevron: "[A] court may not substitute its own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency."1 27
Even if one insisted upon applying constitutional avoid-
ance in a Chevron analysis, the dissent in Valenzuela Gallardo
raises an excellent point. It seems that Congress wanted the
statutory language to be interpreted broadly and to its consti-
tutional limits by its inclusion of the phrase "relating to."' 28 If
Congress did not want the agency to do this, it should have just
said "obstruction of justice" crimes, not crimes "relating to ob-
struction of justice."1 29 Thus, I do not believe that constitu-
tional avoidance should have a role to play in Chevron, and
even if it did, it would be incorrect to use it in the context of this
statute.
One of the most basic tools of statutory construction is to
look to the plain meaning of the statute's text, as the court did
in Chevron. 30 The Ninth Circuit and Fifth Circuit do not dis-
cuss the process they used to interpret the text, but simply
state that they thought the text was ambiguous (again we do
not know why they think this; they must not have thought it
important enough to explain).131 In contrast, the Third Cir-
cuit's step one analysis revolves entirely around textual analy-
sis.132 The Third Circuit in Denis and the Flores dissent says
there are two distinct phrases: "relating to" and "obstruction of
justice."13 3 Both of these phrases have meanings that can eas-
fly be defined.' 3 4 "Relating to" means a logical connection, and
there is a list of crimes that the federal government groups
125 See supra subpart III.B.
126 See id.
127 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
128 See Valenzuela Galardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 832 (9th Cir. 2016); supra
subpart III.B.
129 See supra subpart III.B.
130 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 859-62.
131 See supra subpart III.B; subpart III.C.
132 See supra subpart III.D.
133 See id.
134 See id.
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together as "obstruction of justice" crimes.13 5 The phrase "re-
lating to" has to mean something given the presumption that
all of the words in a statute have meaning. ' 3 6 Thus, the statu-
tory language is not ambiguous. It means that crimes that
bear a logical connection to the ones listed in the obstruction of
justice grouping are aggravated felonies, and there is no room
for the agency to interpret the language differently. I find this
analysis to be especially persuasive.
A final tool of statutory interpretation often applied is to
review extrinsic evidence of congressional intent to determine
how Congress would have wanted the language to be con-
strued. 137 Similar to constitutional avoidance doctrine, it is
unclear whether courts are meant to apply this tool in a Chev-
ron analysis. There is currently a circuit split on this, with
some saying it should be used and some saying it should
not.13 8 Although the courts disagree today on the appropriate-
ness of looking to legislative intent when performing a Chevron
analysis, the court in Chevron did look at legislative history,
finding it "unilluminating" in its quest to interpret the "station-
ary source" language. 1 Many conservative judges and schol-
ars are opposed to using this method because legislative
history is unreliable, mixed, and is not necessarily reflected in
the final statutory product due to intervening compromises.1 4 0
With that said, extrinsic evidence can be useful (though
not dispositive) where Congress's intent is relatively clear. In
the case of the INA's aggravated felony language, it is easy to
glean Congress's intent. The INA was passed at a time when
Americans were deeply afraid, rightly or wrongly, of Commu-
nist subversion. 141 Given these concerns, Congress passed a
law that placed tight restrictions on immigration from Eastern
European and Asian nations, and that authorized the federal
government to deport resident aliens convicted of a broad
swath of crimes.1 4 2 Though the ethnic restrictions are not in
place today, the ability to deport alien criminals has been ex-
panded in our post-9/11 world to remove people who support
135 See id.
136 See id.
137 See Marguerite M. Suivan, Brown and Williamson v. FDA: Finding Con-
gressional Intent Through Creative Statutory Interpretation-A Departure from
Chevron, 94 Nw. L. REV. 273, 284-85 (1999).
138 See Forte, supra note 119, at 730.
139 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 862-64
(1984).
140 See Forte, supra note 119, at 738-39.
141 See supra Part I.
142 See id.
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terrorism.1 43 There is a common denominator in all of this
congressional activity: a desire to keep Americans safe from
criminal alien residents. Additionally, given that the INA's ag-
gravated felony section references just about every crime imagi-
nable, it seems that Congress wanted this protection to be
applied broadly. 144
Putting all of this together, the optimal interpretation of the
"relating to obstruction of justice" language within the INA is to
apply the common-sense textual interpretation that the Third
Circuit dissent in Flores advocates. The use of legislative his-
tory is also useful, though not dispositive, to justify this broad
reading. The goal of the INA is to protect Americans, and the
Flores dissent's broad reading of the statutory language best
reflects that intent. Finally, the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance as applied by the Ninth Circuit has no place here
because the statutory language is not vague and open to multi-
ple interpretations. Even if one insisted on using the constitu-
tional avoidance doctrine, it seems that Congress did want the
statute to stretch the limits of the Constitution based on the
language "relating to."
There is a question, which the Ninth Circuit alludes to in
Valenzuela Gallardo, as well as the Third Circuit in Flores, as to
whether the construction this Note advocates for would be con-
stitutional. The Ninth Circuit said that the BIA's and Fifth
Circuit's interpretation, requiring a specific intent to interfere
with the process of justice, raised questions of constitutional
vagueness. The Ninth Circuit raised the issue that it is not
clear what constitutes the "process of justice."14 5 Although it
did not discuss this Note's approach, the Ninth Circuit would
likely find similar concerns with our "logically related" analysis.
Constitutional vagueness is admittedly a valid issue. As
the Ninth Circuit correctly points out, the Supreme Court re-
cently struck down part of a different federal categorical
crime.146 The term "crime of violence" is used in several federal
statutes and is one of the categories of aggravated felonies. It is
defined as follows:
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another, or
143 See icL
144 See id.
145 See Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 821-822 (9th Cir. 2016).
146 See id. at 819.
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(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the
person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense.1 4 7
The Supreme Court held in Johnson v. United States that the
residual language' 48 of § 16(b) was unconstitutionally
vague. 149 The Fifth Amendment prohibits the application of
criminal statutes that do not provide a potential criminal with
fair notice of the type of conduct it seeks to punish.15 0 The
major problem with this statutory language is that it leaves
open the question of what is a "substantial risk" that the crime
will involve the use of physical force against another?'1 How
is a potential violator supposed to evaluate whether his actions
will contravene this law? Does carrying a sawed-off shotgun
involve such a risk? What about robbing a bank?
The interpretation this Note advocates for may seem to
raise similar problems. How is a potential violator of the stat-
ute supposed to know what sort of crimes are logically related
to the crimes listed under obstruction ofjustice? Although this
is a valid concern, the "relating to obstruction of justice" cate-
gory is significantly different from the "crime of violence" cate-
gory in at least one respect: there is a listing of specific behavior
that constitutes obstruction of justice that potential violators of
the law can look to. In the crime of violence case, there was no
such listing. Although the "relating to" language expanding the
list to include logically related crimes dilutes that clarity some-
what, I think it is much clearer what sort of conduct should be
avoided here than in the crime of violence scenario.
Additionally, the court's ruling in Johnson was closely di-
vided, 6-3, as to whether the language in question was uncon-
stitutionally vague. The three dissenters (Kennedy, Thomas,
and Alito) remain on the Court, and the author of the opinion,
Justice Scalia, is deceased.1 5 2 President Trump ran on a "law
and order" platform that was also highly suspect of immigra-
tion. 15 He will probably nominate anywhere from one to four
147 18 U.S.C. § 16 (1984).
148 This would be the language "involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing
the offense." Id. at § 16(b).
149 Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2554 (2015).
150 See id. at 2556-57.
151 See id. at 2558.
152 Id. at 2555.
153 Jose DelReal, Trump Ratchets Up Nationalist and Law-and-Order Rhetoric
on Campaign Trail, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2006), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/trump-ratchets-up-nationalist-and-law-and-order-rhetoric-on-
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Supreme Court justices in the coming years. It is likely (though
impossible to predict) that the makeup of the Court will change
in a direction that is less favorable to criminal defendants,
which bodes well for the interpretation this Note advocates.
D. Public Policy Considerations
This broader reading of the "relating to obstruction of jus-
tice" language is not only optimal from a statutory interpreta-
tion perspective, but also is best for public policy reasons.
Many of the resident aliens in this country are decent, law-
abiding people who contribute to the economic and cultural
well-being of our nation. At the same time, there are definitely
plenty of "bad hombres."15 4 There are people like Mr. Denis,
who after killing a customer in his place of business, cut her
body into pieces and buried them in a suitcase under his base-
ment floor.1 5 5 Or Ms. Gamboa-Garcia, who attempted to help a
murderer escape justice by driving and subsequently cleaning
the getaway car. 156
We have enough citizens in this country who are derelicts.
We do not need to allow resident aliens to continue to stay here
if they do not follow our laws. It makes sense to give the gov-
ernment all the tools possible so that it can maintain law and
order. Some may argue that the people who are convicted of a
crime "relating to obstruction of justice" are not likely to be
violent, or if they are, they are probably deportable under a
different crime (remember, the list of aggravated felonies is
quite inclusive). The problem with that theory is two-fold.
First, even if a criminal alien resident is not violent, the types of
crimes involved under the obstruction of justice banner involve
attacks on our system of law enforcement and judicial process
(witness tampering, accessory after the fact, perjury). An at-
tack on the integrity of our justice system is arguably even
worse than violent crime.
Second, while the argument that many of these criminals
would likely be deportable under a different offense seems logi-
cal, and is perhaps correct in many cases, this would not al-
ways be true. Looking back at the accessory after the fact
campaign-trail/2016/09/22/73d708a8-80c3-1 1e6-b002-307601806392_story.
html?utmterm=.8f0bdOd6efd4. [https://perma.cc/TNU4-XY2A].
154 Vivan Salama, Trump to Mexico: Take care of the 'bad honabres' or US might,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 2, 2017), https://apnews.com/Ob3f5db59b2e4aa78cdbbf
008f27fb49 [http://perma.cc/G5GU-QPQLI.
155 See Denis v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 633 F.3d 201, 204 (3d Cir.
2011).
156 See United States v. Gamboa-Garcia, 620 F.3d 546, 547 (5th Cir. 2010).
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example, someone who makes a conscious effort to assist a
murderer would not be deportable under the Ninth or Third
Circuits' interpretations because that crime does not require
interference with a judicial proceeding. Someone who con-
sciously assists a felon, even if they did not have the specific
intention of interfering with an investigation or judicial pro-
ceeding, should be considered equally culpable as someone
who commits perjury (a deportable offense).
Additionally, a recent post on the Michigan Journal of Race
& Law website discussing the Valenzuela Gallardo decision
expressed support for the Ninth Circuit's position that the
BIA's interpretation was invalid under the constitutional avoid-
ance doctrine. 15 7 The author believes that the BIA's and Fifth
Circuit's interpretation, and presumably15 8 the Third Circuit's
position on this issue, essentially exposes resident aliens to a
risk of deportation for relatively minor crimes. 5 9 It is certainly
true that the interpretation this Note advocates for would make
it easier to deport criminal resident aliens who connit certain
offenses. But to suggest that it would open them up to deporta-
tion for relatively minor crimes is an overstatement. Under the
interpretation this Note is advocating for, the criminal alien still
must have committed a crime that is logically connected to one
of the "obstruction of justice" crimes listed in the U.S. Code.
These are not minor crimes-they are serious ones that do
great damage to the integrity of our justice system. Addition-
ally, it is important to remember that the statute also requires
that for an offense to make an immigrant deportable, it must
entail a term of imprisonment of at least one year.160
Finally, just because someone is "deportable" does not
mean that they will be deported. The Attorney General must
pursue deportation.161 It is generally unlikely, and in fact un-
desirable, for the Attorney General to expend resources in the
pursuit of deportations for minor crimes. The Attorney General
is more likely to use his limited resources to pursue serious or
politically relevant criminal activity.
157 Amy Luong, Ninth Circuit Rejects Board of Immigration Appeals' Interpreta-
tion, Creates Circuit Split, MICH. J. OF RACE & LAw, https://mjrl.org/2016/09/12/
9th-circuit-rejects-board-of-immigration-appeals-interpretation-creates-circuit-
split/ [https://perma.ce/YBP6-94B2].
158 The article does not discuss the Third Circuit's interpretation, i.e. the
interpretation I am advocating for. However, it is safe to say the author would
likely find the same problems and be equally opposed.
159 See Luong, supra note 157.
160 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2008).
161 See id. at § 1227(a); itd. at § 1227(d)(4).
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FINAL THOUGHTS
The law must give our government every opportunity to
protect Americans from the actions of criminal alien residents.
This includes interpreting our existing statutes to provide the
government with the broadest authority possible to deport resi-
dent aliens who violate our laws. As such, the optimal inter-
pretation of the "relating to obstruction of justice" language
within the INA is to implement the common sense textual inter-
pretation applied by the Third Circuit, reading the statute
broadly to encompass crimes that are listed in the obstruction
of justice heading in the U.S. Code, as well as other logically
related crimes.
